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The current study examined on-line behavior recategorization as
a mechanism underlying corrections for contextual influences in
dispositional inferences. After watching an initial comparison
video that portrayed either a successful or unsuccessful perfor-
mance on a spatial ability task, cognitive load and no load par-
ticipants watched and made real-time ratings of a target perfor-
mance. The comparison video was expected to exert a contrastive
influence on participants’ automatic impressions of the perfor-
mance (behavior categorizations) and the child’s intelligence
(dispositional inferences). Load participants’ on-line and post-
video performance and ability ratings showed this expected
effect, as did no load participants’ initial on-line performance
ratings. However, no load participants’ later on-line and post-
video ratings did not. These findings support the notion that
corrections for contextual influence can occur at the level of
behavior identification as perceivers encode behavioral cues.
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A ssessing the underlying dispositions of others is of
primary importance if one wishes to explain, predict,
and control the social world (Heider, 1958). Thus, it is
no surprise that researchers have devoted a great deal of
attention over the years to understanding how people
draw dispositional inferences, where they might go
wrong, and how they might correct for, or altogether
avoid, potential mistakes (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Heider,
1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972; Trope, 1986).
Our research is in this tradition. More specifically, we
focus here on the implicit effects of contextual informa-
tion on dispositional judgments and on a mechanism of
correction heretofore neglected by attribution research-
ers: behavior recategorization. Before describing our
research, however, we first review briefly the major con-
temporary models of the dispositional inference pro-
cess.
DISPOSITIONAL INFERENCE MODELS
The contemporary models divide the process of mak-
ing inferences about the causes of others’ behaviors into
two stages: identification and dispositional inference
(Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986, 1998). In
the identification stage, perceivers categorize a person’s
behavior in trait-relevant terms (e.g., he performed
intelligently). They then use this categorization in the
dispositional inference stage and often entertain the ini-
tial hypothesis that a correspondent disposition (e.g., he
is intelligent) was responsible for the observed behavior.
If motivated and able, they subsequently correct this
dispositional inference for any plausible, alternative
causal factors (e.g., task ease).
The stage models also suggest that two basic kinds of
errors can occur in the dispositional inference process:
identification and inference errors (Trope, 1986, 1998).
Identification errors result when situational information
exerts an undue influence on perceivers’ categorizations
of another’s behavior. This is particularly likely to hap-
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pen when behavioral cues are ambiguous, or open to dif-
ferent categorizations, and when contextual informa-
tion precedes observation of the behavior (Trope &
Alfieri, 1997; Trope, Cohen, & Alfieri, 1991; Trope,
Cohen, & Maoz, 1988). The behavior of a weeping
woman, for example, likely would be construed differ-
ently depending on whether it were observed within the
context of a funeral or a wedding (i.e., she may be seen as
shedding tears of sorrow at a funeral but tears of joy at a
wedding). Certainly, such knowledge of the situation
oftentimes can be essential in achieving an accurate
understanding of another’s behavior. However, it also
can bias behavior interpretations and initial dispositional
inferences. It can cause perceivers to see a behavior and
corresponding disposition as more extreme than they
actually are.
Inferential errors occur when perceivers fail to con-
sider carefully all plausible alternative causes (e.g., the
situation) of an observed behavior. Returning to our ear-
lier example, if perceivers were to fail to take the funeral
setting into account, they might well have concluded
that the woman was depressed, when in fact she was not
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Trope, 1986). Such a thorough
analysis of alternative explanations requires a fair
amount of motivation and the devotion of cognitive
resources. It is, therefore, not surprising that inferential
errors are more likely when perceivers are under cogni-
tive load or when their motivation is low (Gilbert et al.,
1988; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; Trope & Alfieri,
1997).
Is one type of error more difficult to address than the
other? The available evidence (Gilbert & Malone, 1995;
Trope, 1986; Trope & Alfieri, 1997) suggests that infer-
ential errors are easier to correct than are errors of iden-
tification. The latter occur automatically and appear to
the perceiver to reflect the objective properties of the
stimulus or person (Trope, 1986, 1998; Trope & Alfieri,
1997; Trope & Gaunt, 1999). For this reason, perceivers
are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences
for plausible situational explanations of behavior (i.e.,
the woman appeared depressed because she was at a
funeral) than they are to remove situational influences
from their behavior categorizations (i.e., the woman’s
behavior appeared more depressed than it really was
because it occurred at a depressing event).
Trope and Alfieri (1997) recently offered support for
the idea that correction of behavior categorizations does
not occur, even under optimal processing conditions. In
their study, they exposed participants, who either were
under load or no load, to situational information indi-
cating that an evaluator had been pressured to provide
either a positive or negative assessment of a job candi-
date. Next, participants were given the evaluator’s
ambiguous assessment of the job candidate. Trope and
Alfieri found that although no load participants were
able to correct their judgments of the evaluator’s true
opinion of the candidate (dispositional inference) for
the situational demands, they were unable to adjust their
categorizations of the evaluation itself; that is, they still
assimilated the ambiguous assessment to the situational
demands.
THE CURRENT RESEARCH
Although the findings of the above-mentioned study
provide some support for the notion that recategoriza-
tion is not possible, other researchers have argued that
under certain circumstances, perceivers may be able to
recategorize observed behavior (Kunda, 1998; Weary,
Reich, & Tobin, 2001; Weary, Tobin, & Reich, 2001).
Indeed, much of the evidence for this argument has
come from our lab.
In our studies, participants typically are asked to view
a videotape of a child performing several spatial ability
tasks and then to rate the success of his performance
(behavior categorization) and his level of intelligence
(dispositional inference). The results generally show
that contextual information about the target child’s pre-
vious performance or about another child’s perfor-
mance influences load participants’ behavior categoriza-
tions and dispositional inferences in either an
assimilative or contrastive manner, with the direction of
the effect depending on how the information is
categorized.1 The results also show, however, that the
judgments of no load participants are adjusted for the
contextual information; that is, their behavior categori-
zations and dispositional inferences show either no or
reverse effects (e.g., in the direction of corrective assimi-
lation when load participants show contrast) of the con-
textual performance.
Although our prior research suggests that behavior
recategorization may be possible under certain circum-
stances, it is important to note that our studies assessed
behavior categorizations after an entire behavioral epi-
sode had been encoded (Weary, Reich, & Tobin, 2001;
Weary, Tobin, & Reich, 2001). Such a method leaves
open the possibility that perceivers first corrected their
dispositional inferences in light of the contextual bias
and then later merely adjusted their behavior categoriza-
tions to be consistent. More important, such a method
also leaves open the possibility that the no load
perceivers managed to avoid the influence of the con-
text altogether, that there was no initial bias for which
corrections needed to be undertaken. A method that is
able to demonstrate early influence and later correction
within the same group of participants would provide
stronger evidence for a correction stage.
With this goal in mind, the current study sought to
examine perceivers’ continuous behavior categoriza-
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tions as they encoded the target’s behaviors. More specif-
ically, we assessed on-line behavior categorizations by
having participants use a joystick to rate continuously a
videotaped performance of a child completing several
spatial ability tasks. We manipulated contextual informa-
tion by first showing participants a video that depicted a
very successful or unsuccessful performance of a differ-
ent child performing similar tasks. Furthermore, we
placed half of our participants under cognitive load
while they watched and rated the main video.
Based on past research, we expected that the prior
performance would be seen as distinct from the target’s
current performance and would, as a result, serve as a
comparison standard (Martin & Seta, 1983; Weary,
Tobin, & Reich, 2001). Therefore, we expected to see
contrast from it in participants’ on-line categorizations
of the main target’s behavior under cognitive load condi-
tions. When participants were under no load, however,
we expected the contextual influence of the prior per-
formance on their on-line behavior categorizations to
change over time; that is, we expected to see contrast
from contextual information initially, followed by a
recategorization of behavior. This recategorization was
expected to result from an awareness of bias arising from
the phenomenological experience of surprise (Kunda,
1998; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) that often accompanies
unexpected events (e.g., the child did much better than
I thought he would). In addition to obtaining partici-
pants’ on-line ratings, we also obtained final assessments
of their postvideo behavior categorizations and
dispositional judgments. We expected to replicate our
past findings on these reported target inferences. Spe-
cifically, we expected to see contrast from contextual
information under load and no contrast under no load
conditions.
METHODS
Video Piloting
For the current study, we required comparison per-
formances that were clearly better and clearly worse than
the target’s performance in the main video. To this end,
we created two new comparison videos: one showed a
child successfully completing two block designs from the
Stanford-Binet test in a total of 56 s, and the other
showed the same child failing to complete a single
design in 74 s.2 The main video, by contrast, showed a dif-
ferent child completing three block designs in a total of
211 s (as used in Weary, Reich, & Tobin, 2001; Weary,
Tobin, & Reich, 2001). All videos were silent and the per-
formance outcomes were partially obscured. To assure
that the comparison videos were categorized correctly,
however, we provided participants with additional infor-
mation about those performances. Specifically, before
participants watched the successful and unsuccessful
comparison videos, we informed them that the child had
been either very successful or not successful in matching
all designs within the time limits, respectively.
We examined participants’ perceptions of the three
videos in a pilot study. Thirty-eight men (N = 11) and
women (N = 27) enrolled in an introductory psychology
class were randomly assigned to view the unsuccessful
comparison video, the successful comparison video, or
the main video. Participants were first given the opportu-
nity to practice using the joystick by moving it from left to
right for 45 s. During this practice period, they were able
to observe that their joystick movements controlled a
pointer that moved along a 9-point scale on the com-
puter screen (1 = all the way left, 9 = all the way right). Fol-
lowing this practice period, participants were told that
they would watch a video of a child performing a spatial
ability task and that their goal was to figure out how intel-
ligent the child was. They were instructed to use the joy-
stick to rate continuously the overall quality of the per-
formance in the video on a scale of 1 (very unsuccessful) to
9 (very successful). After watching and rating one of the
videos, participants completed several additional items.
Specifically, they rated on 9-point scales the difficulty of
the spatial ability task (not at all difficult to very difficult),
the child’s likability (not at all likable to very likable), the
ease with which they had been able to tell how well the
child had performed (not at all easy to very easy), the clar-
ity of the child’s performance (not at all unclear to very
unclear), the clarity of the task’s difficulty (not at all
unclear to very unclear), and the difficulty of ascertaining
the child’s performance outcome (very easy to very
difficult).
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted
on participants’ average on-line ratings revealed that the
videos differed in the level of success that they portrayed,
F(2, 34) = 9.84, p < .001. Planned t test comparisons
revealed that compared to the main video (M = 5.46),
the performance in the successful comparison video was
viewed as significantly better (M = 6.01), t(34) = –2.03, p <
.05, and the performance in the unsuccessful compari-
son video was viewed as significantly worse (M = 4.71),
t(34) = 2.68, p < .05.3 Analyses of the other postvideo rat-
ings revealed no significant video differences (ps > .17).
Participants
Participants in the main study were 97 men (N = 45)
and women (N = 52) enrolled in an introductory psy-
chology class. The data for 1 participant were excluded
because she reported having difficulty controlling the
joystick. Up to 7 participants were run in a given session,
but each participant was assigned to an individual cubi-
cle. All participants were randomly assigned to condi-
tions in this 2 (comparison standard: unsuccessful, suc-
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cessful) × 2 (cognitive load: no load, load) between-
subjects factorial design.
Procedure
A female experimenter greeted the participants and
explained that the study would be conducted on com-
puters. Participants then were led to individual cubicles
and were told to begin the experiment, which was run by
MediaLab (Jarvis, 2000).
After answering some demographic questions, partic-
ipants read that they would be watching a videotape of a
child performing a spatial ability task and that afterward
they would be asked to give their impressions of the per-
formance. They also learned that they would use a joy-
stick to make their ratings of the child. Next, participants
were given two practice tasks to become familiar with the
joystick rating procedure. First, they practiced moving
the joystick from left to right for 20 s as the joystick posi-
tion appeared on the computer screen on a scale of 1 (all
the way left) to 9 (all the way right). Then, they used the joy-
stick to rate a dynamic target; specifically, they used it to
rate on a scale of 1 (very small) to 9 (very big) the size of a
square that grew and shrank in size over the course of a
minute.
After the two practice periods, participants received
additional instructions about the upcoming videotape
task. They were told that they could select one of four
videotapes, each of which showed a different child com-
pleting different spatial ability tasks. The tasks were
described as puzzles that were part of a general intelli-
gence test. Participants were told that some children per-
formed their tasks quite successfully, whereas others
were less successful. They then were given the following
instructions:
It will be your task to figure out HOW INTELLIGENT
THE CHILD IS in general. As you know, very intelligent
people sometimes appear less intelligent because they
are performing a very difficult task and less intelligent
people sometimes appear very intelligent because they
are performing a very simple task. We do not want you to
tell us how intelligent the child merely appears. Instead,
we want you to watch the child on the tape and figure out
how intelligent you think the child is in general.
Participants next were informed that they would be
asked to use the joystick throughout the video to indicate
the overall quality of the child’s performance on the vari-
ous puzzles and that their continuous ratings of the per-
formance would appear on a scale below the video.
These ratings ranged from very unsuccessful to very success-
ful. Participants next chose one of the four ostensibly dif-
ferent videotapes to watch as the main video. In reality,
all participants watched the same main video but we
wanted them to think that that it was selected from a
range of performances. After selecting a tape, they were
given some additional information about their selection.
First, they were told,
We find that people feel more comfortable answering
questions about the performance in the main video
when they are familiar with what is typically involved in a
spatial ability task. Since most college students do not
have much experience with spatial ability tasks, we usu-
ally show participants a short example video clip to
familiarize them with the task before they watch the
main performance.
Participants then read some additional comments
about the child in the main video. Specifically, they were
told that the child in the main video was 9 years old and
that he was part of a family testing program and hap-
pened to be the brother of the child in the example
video that they were about to watch.
Comparison standard video. Prior to viewing the exam-
ple, or comparison video, participants received the fol-
lowing instructions with either the word VERY or NOT
inserted before successful:
When you click continue, a video clip of a child perform-
ing some spatial ability puzzles will play. These puzzles
are part of a general intelligence test and the child’s task
is to put together the blocks so that they match a design
provided by the examiner. You will not be able to see the
design that the child is trying to match because of the
camera angle in this particular video. However, this child
was VERY (NOT) successful in matching all designs
within the time limits.
Half of the participants further were instructed to use
the joystick to rate the overall quality of the performance
in the comparison video.4 All participants then watched
(and half also rated) either the successful or unsuccess-
ful comparison tape.
Cognitive load. After watching one of the comparison
standard videos, all participants were reminded that
while watching the main video, they were to use the joy-
stick to rate the overall quality of the performance in the
video and that their task was to figure out how intelligent
the child was. Participants in the load condition also
were told that an 8-digit code number would appear on
the next screen right before the videotape started. They
were to rehearse this number while watching the video,
without writing it down anywhere. The 8-digit number
then appeared for 20 s and was followed by the main
video.
Dependent measures. Joystick ratings of the success of
the performance in the main videotape served as the pri-
mary dependent measure in the current study. As
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participants watched and rated the main video, the posi-
tion of the pointer on the scale was recorded every 100
ms. These ratings then were averaged for each second
and written to a data file. We also were interested in par-
ticipants’ postvideo assessments of the target’s behavior
and level of ability. Accordingly, after watching the main
video, participants completed items that assessed their
behavior categorizations (“The success of the children’s
performance on the four videotapes you chose from dif-
fered. What level of performance was depicted in the
tape you watched?” 1 = very unsuccessful to 9 = very success-
ful), dispositional inferences (“How would you rate the
current spatial ability of the child in the video?” 1 = very
low to 9 = very high), and ability-irrelevant impressions of
the child (“How likable is the child in the video?” 1 = not
at all likable to 9 = very likable; and “How would you rate
this child’s social skills?” 1 = very poor to 9 = very good). Fol-
lowing these items, participants in the load condition
recorded the digits they had been rehearsing.
Next, all participants completed a manipulation
check item that asked them to rate on a scale of 1 (very
unsuccessful) to 9 (very successful) how successful the per-
formance had been in the short video (i.e., the compari-
son video) that they had watched before the main one.
They also rated whether watching the first video made
their initial impressions of the child in the main video
more positive or more negative than they would have
been without having watched the first video (–4 = more
negative, +4 = more positive).
Following these items, participants completed six sur-
prise multiple-choice questions that tested their atten-
tion to detail in the main video. Specifically, participants
indicated the number of test items in the video, the color
of the child’s shirt, what was in the background, the color
of the test administrator’s hair, the color of the blocks,
and the relation of the child in the video to the child in
the short video they watched earlier. Finally, all partici-
pants were fully debriefed and thanked.
RESULTS
Recall
Digit recall. Researchers recommend examining the
overall recall rate on a cognitive load task to ensure that
the task is difficult enough to present a cognitive
demand for participants (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000;
Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). The overall rate of digits cor-
rectly recalled and placed in the current study (M =
80%) was comparable to that found in other studies
(Weary, Reich, & Tobin, 2001; Weary, Tobin, & Reich,
2001) and indicated that the task was not too easy for
participants.
In addition, researchers generally suggest that partici-
pants with extremely low recall be excluded. Such partic-
ipants likely are not engaged in the secondary memory
task and, thus, are not under load (Bargh & Chartrand,
2000; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Weary, Reich, & Tobin,
2001; Weary, Tobin, & Reich, 2001). Accordingly, we
excluded the nine participants who correctly recalled
fewer than half of the digits. For the remaining partici-
pants, there was no effect of comparison standard condi-
tion on the number of digits correctly recalled and
placed (p = .69).
Video recall. The average number of video items cor-
rectly recalled in the current study was 4.71 out of 6. This
rate is very similar to that found in previous studies using
the same video (Weary, Reich, & Tobin, 2001; Weary,
Tobin, & Reich, 2001) and suggests that introducing the
on-line rating procedure did not interfere with encod-
ing the details of the video. Consistent with our exclu-
sion rule for digits recalled, we excluded the one partici-
pant who correctly recalled fewer than half of the details
about the videotape. For the remaining participants,
there were no effects of comparison standard or load
conditions on video recall (ps > .37)
Comparison Videos
A 2 (comparison video) × 2 (cognitive load) ANOVA
on participants’ postvideo ratings of how successful the
comparison video was revealed only the expected main
effect of comparison video, F(1, 81) = 30.40, p < .001. Par-
ticipants rated the unsuccessful video as less successful
(Ms = 3.22 vs. 6.15).
Main Video
Participants provided continuous success ratings of
the child’s performance on three block design items in
the main video so that we could examine over time the
possible contrastive effects of the comparison videos
and, among no load participants, potential on-line
behavior recategorization. As one examines these data,
displayed in Figure 1, it is clear that comparison video
condition had an impact on ratings of the main perfor-
mance. Participants who had seen the unsuccessful ver-
sus successful comparison video tended to rate the main
performance as more successful. However, the degree of
contrast differs across video clips (i.e., test items) as a
function of load. The lack of contrast in Video Clip 3
among no load participants indicates that these partici-
pants were able to engage in recategorization, removing
the early influence of the comparison video from their
ratings of the main performance.
In addition to these patterns, there also are within-
video clip patterns exhibited by load and no load partici-
pants alike. These patterns mirror the child’s perfor-
mance progress in each video clip: the child begins and
then completes a puzzle. Because success is difficult to
determine in the beginning of each clip (i.e., when the
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child has placed only a few blocks in position), partici-
pants’ performance ratings hover around the scale mid-
point. At the end of each clip, the completion of a design
signifies at least some level of success, and participants’
performance ratings for the child are higher as a result.
To examine whether the degree of contrast differed
significantly across the test items as a function of load, we
averaged on-line ratings within video clip and then con-
ducted a 2 (comparison video) × 2 (load) × 3 (clip)
mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures on the
last factor. In addition to significant main effects of video
clip, F(2, 162) = 19.06, p < .001, and comparison video,
F(1, 81) = 13.55, p < .001, the analysis revealed a signifi-
cant Comparison Video × Load × Video Clip interaction
effect, F(2, 162) = 4.15, p < .05. Planned comparisons
revealed the predicted effects: Load participants showed
significant contrast from the comparison video during
all three video clips, ts(162) = 2.03, 5.46, and 4.41 for
clips 1, 2, and 3, respectively, ps < .05, but no load partici-
pants only showed significant contrast during the first
two video clips, ts(162) = 3.52 and 3.02 for clips 1 and 2,
respectively, ps < .05; t(162) = 0.25 for clip 3, p > .80 (see
Figure 2). No load participants’ on-line ratings on video
clip 3 were indicative of behavior recategorization.5
Final Target Judgments
We next examined whether the on-line rating proce-
dure produced any differences in participants’ post-
video ratings of the target’s performance and ability lev-
els. Recall that in past research employing the same pro-
cedures used herein, we have obtained inferential con-
trast under load and correction for contrast effects
under no load conditions.
First, we examined participants’ categorizations of
the main target’s behavior. A 2 (comparison video) × 2
(cognitive load) ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of comparison video, F(1, 81) = 5.84, p < .05, on
performance ratings such that those participants in the
unsuccessful (M = 7.34) compared to successful (M =
6.42) comparison video conditions rated the main per-
formance as significantly more successful. The interpre-
tation of this main effect, however, was qualified by the
presence of a significant Comparison Video × Load
interaction effect, F(1, 81) = 5.87, p < .05. Planned com-
parisons revealed a significant contrast effect under
load: Compared to those participants who had viewed
the successful comparison video (M = 6.20), those
exposed to the unsuccessful one (M = 8.05) perceived
the main performance as significantly better, t(81) =
3.34, p < .05. Under no load conditions, however, partici-
pants’ behavior perceptions of the main target were
unaffected by the comparison performances (Ms = 6.64
vs. 6.63 for the unsuccessful and successful comparison
video conditions, respectively), t(81) = 0.01, p > .99.
We next examined participants’ postvideo dispositional
inferences of the child’s ability level. A 2 (comparison
video)× 2 (cognitive load) ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of comparison video on ability ratings such
that those who viewed the unsuccessful (M = 7.09) com-
pared to successful (M = 6.04) comparison video rated
the child as possessing significantly higher ability, F(1,
81) = 7.72, p < .05. The interpretation of this main effect,
however, was qualified by the presence of a significant
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Figure 1 On-line ratings of the main video as a function of compari-
son video and cognitive load.
NOTE: Each video clip showed the child beginning and completing a
puzzle.
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Figure 2 Average on-line ratings of the main video as a function of
comparison video, load, and video clip.
Comparison Video × Load interaction effect, F(1, 81) =
4.05, p < .05. Planned comparisons revealed a significant
contrast effect under load: Participants who viewed the
unsuccessful (M = 7.62) compared to successful (M =
5.80) comparison video viewed the main child as signifi-
cantly higher in ability, t(81) = 3.30, p < .01. Under no
load conditions, however, participants’ perceptions of
the main child’s ability were not significantly affected by
the comparison video (Ms = 6.57 vs. 6.27 for the unsuc-
cessful and successful comparison video conditions,
respectively), t(81) = 0.58, p > .56.
Mediational Analyses
Although analyses of participants’ later on-line and
postvideo target ratings revealed the same pattern of
results (contrast among load participants, correction
among no load participants), a more precise statement
of the process by which participants draw their
dispositional inferences requires the support of media-
tional analyses. Theoretically, dispositional inferences
should be based on categorizations of the observed
behavior, because behavior is the raw data on which
higher order social inferences are based (Heider, 1958).
Among our load participants, this relationship should
have been fairly straightforward, because their categori-
zations were influenced by the comparison video during
all three video clips; their postvideo behavior categoriza-
tions and dispositional inferences should have been con-
sistent with their early (and, of course, later) on-line
impressions. This consistency of early on-line impres-
sions and postvideo behavior categorizations, however,
was not expected for no load participants; their behavior
categorizations were expected to be influenced early on
by, but to be corrected later for, the contextual influence
of the comparison videos. Their final, postvideo behav-
ior categorizations and dispositional inferences, then,
should have been based on their corrected on-line
impressions.
To examine what participants based their dispositional
inferences on, we first created two on-line indices: one
was the average of participants’ on-line ratings prior to
the point at which no load participants showed
recategorization (Video Clips 1 and 2) and the other was
the average of participants’ on-line ratings after this
point (Video Clip 3). We next examined whether these
on-line indices predicted participants’ final, postvideo
behavior categorizations and, in turn, their dispositional
inferences. We conducted these analyses within load
condition because the process was expected to differ as a
function of cognitive resources (i.e., only no load partici-
pants could reasonably be expected to correct their
categorizations).
Starting with the load condition, and following the
steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), we first
regressed dispositional inferences on effects-coded gen-
der (–1 = male, +1 = female), initial on-line ratings
(Video Clips 1 and 2), and later on-line ratings (Video
Clip 3). Gender (β = .58, t = 2.38, p < .05) and initial on-
line ratings (β = 1.18, t = 3.42, p < .01) significantly pre-
dicted dispositional inferences; not surprisingly, later
on-line ratings did not significantly predict dispositional
inferences when the variance attributable to initial rat-
ings was statistically controlled (β = –.02, t = –0.06, p >
.95). Next, we regressed the proposed mediator (final,
postvideo behavior categorizations) on effects-coded
gender, initial on-line ratings, and later on-line ratings.
Gender (β = .50, t = 2.33, p < .05) and initial on-line rat-
ings (β = 1.33, t = 4.39, p < .001) significantly predicted
final, postvideo behavior categorizations, whereas later
on-line ratings did not (β = –.10, t = –0.37, p > .71), again
indicating that participants’ final behavior categoriza-
tions were adequately explained by their initial impres-
sions of the performance. We next examined whether
final behavior categorizations predicted dispositional
inferences when controlling for gender and on-line
impressions. This was the case (β = .82, t = 6.18, p < .001)
and, in addition, gender and on-line impressions
became nonsignificant (ps > .36), indicating that the
effect of early on-line impressions on dispositional infer-
ences was mediated by final behavior categorizations. A
Sobel test revealed that the drop in predictive power of
early on-line impressions was significant when final
behavior categorizations were included in the model, Z =
3.61, p < .001. These findings support the notion that
load participants based their dispositional inferences on
their final behavior categorizations, which were estab-
lished early on in the video.
Next, we conducted the same set of analyses with the
no load condition participants. Both initial (β = 1.03, t =
3.35, p < .01) and later on-line ratings (β = .53, t = 1.99, p =
.05) significantly predicted dispositional inferences. Only
later on-line ratings significantly predicted postvideo
categorizations (β = .86, t = 2.87, p < .01). In addition,
final behavior categorizations predicted dispositional
inferences when gender and on-line impressions were
included in the model (β = .60, t = 6.01, p < .001). Later
on-line impressions no longer predicted dispositional
inferences when final categorizations were included in
the model (β = .01, t = 0.03, p > .97), indicating that the
effect of later on-line impressions on dispositional infer-
ences was mediated by final behavior categorizations. A
Sobel test revealed that this drop in predictive power of
later on-line impressions was significant, Z = 2.62, p < .01.
In addition, early on-line impressions still exerted an
unexpected direct effect on dispositional inferences (β =
.75, t = 3.27, p < .01) when final behavior categorizations
were controlled, suggesting that, at some level, early
impressions did exert some influence, at least on
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dispositional inferences. Aside from this one unex-
pected finding, these analyses support the notion that
behavior categorizations are the basis for dispositional
inferences, even when they undergo correction.6
Awareness of Bias
To be able to correct for any contextual influences on
behavior categorizations, participants must be aware
that their judgments have been contaminated, know the
direction of bias, and have the requisite resources avail-
able to correct their judgments (Wegener & Petty, 1997).
Were our participants aware of the influence that the
comparison video had on their perceptions of the main
performance? Participants rated on a –4 (more negative)
to +4 (more positive) scale whether the first video made
their initial impressions of the child in the main video
more positive or negative than they would have been
without having watched the first video. We converted rat-
ings to a 1 to 9 scale and analyzed the effects of compari-
son standard and load with a two-way ANOVA. Results
revealed only a main effect of comparison video such
that compared to participants who watched the success-
ful comparison video (M = 4.77), those who watched the
unsuccessful one (M= 5.65) thought it had made their
impressions somewhat more positive, F(1, 81) = 3.76, p =
.056. Thus, when asked, load and no load participants
were able to report the direction of influence of the com-
parison video on their early categorizations of the tar-
get’s performance. The above-reported analyses of on-
line and postvideo ratings, however, revealed that only
no load participants were able to adjust their inferences
accordingly during the performance.
Ancillary Measures
Last, we examined whether the effects of our manipu-
lations were specific to behavior categorizations and
dispositional inferences or whether they also appeared
on more general, ability-irrelevant impressions of the
child. If contrast under load and correction under no
load are limited to our focal measures, they more likely
would be due to the use of the comparison performance
as a standard for evaluating the main performance than
to a more general affective reaction to the child. As
expected, our manipulations had no significant effects
on participants’ perceptions of how likable or socially
skilled the child was (ps > .07).
DISCUSSION
Using an on-line rating procedure, the current study
examined automatic contrast in behavior categoriza-
tions and on-line behavior recategorization as a mecha-
nism of correction in the dispositional inference pro-
cess. Findings revealed that although participants’ initial
behavior categorizations were contrasted from accessi-
ble comparison standards, only those with the available
cognitive resources were able to remove this influence
from their judgments as time went on. Specifically,
although both load and no load participants’ early per-
ceptions of the target performance were contrasted away
from the comparison performance they had viewed ear-
lier, only no load participants were able to overcome this
influence during the last portion of the main video and
in their final target judgments.
Behavior Recategorization in the
Dispositional Inference Process
The current study provides direct evidence in support
of Weary and her colleagues’ prior assertions that on-line
behavior recategorization can occur in the dispositional
inference process (Weary, Reich, & Tobin, 2001; Weary,
Tobin, & Reich, 2001). Why have we been able to find evi-
dence of behavior recategorization, or correction, when
others have not? As we have noted in previous articles,
the answer most probably lies in procedural differences
between studies reported by various researchers inter-
ested in behavior categorization processes.
More specifically, studies that have failed to find evi-
dence of behavior recategorization (i.e., Trope & Alfieri,
1997) have provided participants with specific and
prestructured information about situational induce-
ments present in the behavioral context. Such informa-
tion might well have served to disambiguate target
behaviors. In our studies, we have provided participants
with no such information. Indeed, they have had to infer
not only the specific level of the target’s performance
but also the presence and nature of any relevant situa-
tional factors. The information provided to our partici-
pants about the behavioral context, then, likely has left
considerable room for potential categorizations (i.e., a
more or less successful performance) of the observed
performance. Leaving open alternative categorizations
likely makes it easier for participants to recategorize tar-
get behaviors. Supporting this notion, Trope and Sikron
(as cited in Trope & Gaunt, 1999) found that activating
alternative interpretations of ambiguous behavior
through a priming procedure wiped out the usual
assimilative effect of situational inducements on behav-
ior categorizations in their paradigm.
The degree to which the available information con-
strains behavior categorization may be one factor that
determines whether recategorization takes place.
Another factor concerns the nature of the behavioral
cues. Trope and his colleagues typically have examined
contextual influences on ambiguous behaviors, defined
as behaviors that are “highly associated with different
categories” (Trope, 1989, p. 134). Although our behav-
ioral episode can be categorized as more or less success-
ful, it is not highly associated with success and failure.
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Rather, the target’s performance could better be charac-
terized as vague or “weakly associated with the various
categories” (Trope, 1989, p. 134). Trope (1989) suggests
that vague behaviors may be less influenced by contex-
tual factors but may be more likely to give rise to an
awareness of contextual influence because their link to
any particular category is weaker. However, he also
expresses doubt that such an awareness would necessar-
ily stop perceivers from relying on the contextually influ-
enced categorization in the inferential stage of process-
ing. Our findings should help to mitigate such general
doubt. Future research, though, should try to provide
more direct evidence for the moderating role that type
of contextual information and type of behavior may play
in the recategorization process.
One final factor that clearly influenced recategorization
in the current study was the amount of behavioral infor-
mation. We found that no load participants were influ-
enced by accessible contextual information for a sub-
stantial portion of the video before engaging in
recategorization. This highlights the importance of the
length of stimulus exposure in behavior recategorization.
Although having to make a final summative judgment
after viewing only the first minute of the video could
have sparked correction, it also is possible that correc-
tion would only have been evident after viewing the full 3
min of the video. It is likely that in addition to possessing
sufficient levels of motivation and ability, perceivers also
must be exposed to a fair amount of incoming behav-
ioral information for recategorization processes to
occur.
What Drives Recategorization?
We have suggested that in our paradigm, adjustments
to behavior categorizations among no load participants
resulted from their awareness of the impact of a per-
ceived contextual bias. Indeed, we found some evidence
that participants were aware of the influence of the first
video on their initial impressions of the child in the main
video: Those who initially viewed an unsuccessful versus
successful performance thought it had made their initial
impressions of the child more positive. But how exactly
did participants go about adjusting on-line behavior cat-
egorizations? One possibility is that during the last task
in the video, participants made direct adjustments to
their ratings of the behavior in light of their awareness of
the discrepancy between expected and actual perfor-
mance; that is, because the behavior “seemed” different
than expected, participants might have adjusted their
categorizations for the contrastive influence of their
expectancies.
A second possibility, however, is that they first adjusted
not their behavior perceptions but their expectancies
(i.e., comparison standards) in light of the target’s per-
formance on the first two tasks. Such an updating of
expectancies could be the result of either a passive pro-
cess of adaptation (Helson, 1964), or it could be based
on an awareness that one’s expectancies, or comparison
standards, are unreasonable (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris,
1995). Either way, such an adjustment would effectively
reduce the discrepancy between expectancies and
incoming behavioral cues if the actual behavior (i.e.,
level of performance) remained consistent over time.
The lessened impact of the comparison videos on expec-
tancies and the reduced discrepancy between expec-
tancy and behavior should result in behavior categoriza-
tions that are less influenced by the initial comparison
video.
In sum, the observed recategorization among no load
participants in the current study might have been the
result of direct adjustments to behavior categorizations
or it might have been mediated by adjustments to expec-
tancies. Both mechanisms would have the same end
result in this paradigm (behavior recategorization). As a
result, we are unable to definitively favor one mechanism
over another. However, our own best guess is that
perceivers adjust their expectancies in light of incoming
performance information if they have the cognitive
resources to do so. Future research will have to test this
possibility directly.
The On-line Rating Methodology
Potential limitations. One could be concerned that our
method changes the process by which participants per-
ceive and rate target stimuli. Two types of interference
seem possible: the on-line rating task could serve as a
cognitive load, distracting participants from their pri-
mary task of perceiving the target, or the on-line rating
task could force participants to evaluate the target differ-
ently than they otherwise would (i.e., engage in on-line
vs. memory-based evaluation) (Hastie & Park, 1986).
For several reasons, we think the first type of interfer-
ence is unlikely. First, the accuracy of video recall in the
current study was very similar to that obtained in our
other studies where the on-line rating procedure has not
been employed (Weary, Reich, & Tobin, 2001; Weary,
Tobin, & Reich, 2001). Second, if the on-line rating task
effectively had put all participants under cognitive load,
then we would not have observed the correction in on-
line and postvideo ratings that we saw among partici-
pants in our no load condition. Finally, we went to great
lengths to provide participants with adequate practice
with the on-line rating procedure before they rated the
main target: We first allowed them to practice right to
left movements with the joystick and then had them rate
how a target changed over time. This level of practice
with the task should have freed up resources for other
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tasks, such as observing the child’s performance and
evaluating his intelligence.
Did the on-line rating task force participants into a
different mode of evaluation? Did our procedure turn
what typically is a memory-based evaluation into an on-
line one? We also think this is unlikely. Given that partici-
pants in our study were given the goal of figuring out
how intelligent the child was, they probably would have
monitored the relevant performance information even
in the absence of the joystick rating procedure. More-
over, researchers have argued that even without such
explicit instructions, behavior categorizations and
dispositional judgments typically are made on-line
(Trope, 1989; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996).
When using the on-line rating procedure in other areas,
however, researchers should consider the issue of
whether the process of interest is likely to be an on-line
or memory-based one.
Future directions. Our findings, along with other recent
research, illustrate the importance of looking at social
judgments as they unfold over time (Kunda, Davies,
Adams, & Spencer, 2002; Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman,
1994). Using this approach, we were able to examine
judgmental influence and correction as they may occur
in everyday life. In many different settings, behavior is
continually monitored, such as in a job interview, in a
classroom, or during a performance evaluation. Our on-
line data suggest that perceptions of such behavior ini-
tially may be influenced by contextual factors, such as
salient comparison standards (i.e., the previous job
applicant, other students, other performers), regardless
of one’s level of cognitive distraction. However, these ini-
tial influences may be overcome as time goes on if
perceivers have the necessary motivation and cognitive
resources to adjust their inferences.
We think that the joystick-rating procedure used in
the current study easily could be applied to other
research questions that involve time-dependent changes
in social cognitive processes, particularly those that
involve judgmental corrections.7 In the realm of
dispositional inferences, for example, it may be interest-
ing to examine directly and under various conditions
when effortful Stage 2 corrections take place. In other
areas of research, such as stereotyping and prejudice,
researchers could use this methodology to examine
whether perceivers who typically avoid making stereo-
typic judgments are initially as influenced by them, as are
less motivated perceivers. Social cognitive research
examining assimilation and contrast effects also could
use an on-line rating procedure to examine when these
effects occur, and whether the impact of contextual
influences changes over time (i.e., early assimilation
could turn into contrast if participants are aware of bias
and overcorrect for it).
Conclusions
Although several researchers have suggested that
some kinds of contrast in social judgments can occur
automatically, only the most preliminary evidence of
such effects exists in the literature (Moskowitz &
Skurnik, 1999; Weary & Reich, 2001; Weary, Tobin, &
Reich, 2001). The current research not only provides
additional support for the efficiency of comparison-
based contrast effects in dispositional judgments but
illustrates over time and under optimal processing con-
ditions the correction for such effects at the level of
behavior categorizations. Indeed, the evidence provided
by the current research allows us to confidently recom-
mend that behavior recategorization be taken seriously
as a potential means of correction of dispositional infer-
ences. Although much future work will be necessary
before we are able to specify precisely the behaviors for
and the conditions under which such recategorization
occurs, what is clear now is that parts of the dispositional
inference process are more flexible than previously
thought.
NOTES
1. Expectancies that were distinct, or separable, from the represen-
tation of the target’s performance were found to exert a contrastive
influence on target judgments, whereas those that were nondistinct
exerted an assimilative influence (Weary, Tobin, & Reich, 2001).
2. Only one design was used in the unsuccessful comparison video
because a failure on these designs typically took longer than a success.
3. All analyses in this article included gender as a covariate. Overall,
very few gender effects were found. For this reason and because in no
case did gender interact with any of our manipulations, we do not dis-
cuss such effects here.
4. This manipulation was intended to vary the distinctness of the
comparison video. However, simply not rating the comparison video
was insufficient to render it nondistinct from the main video because it
was clearly a different child (and, hence, easily separable from the
main child) and participants likely formed on-line impressions of the
comparison performance even if they did not have to rate it. Because
this manipulation proved unsuccessful, data are reported collapsed
across this variable.
5. In a pilot study, in addition to manipulating participants’ cogni-
tive resources and the level of performance portrayed in the compari-
son video, we included a no-video control condition to examine
whether the contrast we observed above was absolute contrast (i.e., rel-
ative to a group that received no comparison standard) or relative con-
trast. Specifically, 128 men (N = 61) and women (N = 67) were ran-
domly assigned to conditions in this 2 (cognitive load: load, no load) ×
3 (comparison video: successful, unsuccessful, none) between-
participants factorial design. We examined their ratings during a
period in which both load and no load participants in the comparison
video conditions exhibited contrast in their on-line ratings: the last 20 s
of the first and second video clips. We conducted a 3 (comparison
video: unsuccessful, successful, none) × 2 (cognitive load: no load,
load) × 2 (clip) mixed-model ANOVA with video clip (test item) serv-
ing as a repeated measure. In addition to a main effect of video clip,
F(1, 121) = 10.89, p < .01, there also was a significant comparison video
main effect, F(2, 121) = 8.87, p < .001. A Dunnett test revealed that on-
line ratings made by both unsuccessful (M = 6.36) and successful (M =
5.23) comparison video groups differed from ratings made by control
participants (M = 5.87), one-tailed ps = .046 and .013, respectively.
Thus, the contrast we observed can be considered absolute, rather
than just relative, contrast.
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6. This mediational relationship holds up when comparison video
condition is included as a predictor. In addition, although theoretically
we would expect behavior categorizations to precede dispositional
inferences, some may argue that support for the reverse model also
could be found in our data. However, the reverse mediational model
(dispositional inferences mediate the effects of early on-line impres-
sions on later behavior categorizations) did not meet the necessary
requirements. Specifically, among load participants, early on-line
impressions still predicted final behavior categorizations when
dispositional inferences were included in the model (β = .58, t = 2.38, p
< .05), and among no load participants, later on-line impressions still
were associated with final behavior categorizations when dispositional
inferences were included in the model (β = .45, t = 1.95, p = .06). In
addition, among no load participants, the drop in predictive power of
later on-line impressions when dispositional inferences were included
in the model was only marginal (Z = 1.91, p = .06).
7. Other methodologies have been used to identify temporal
changes, including repeated assessments of stereotype activation at
fixed intervals (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002), examination
of cognitive and affective judgments (i.e., with affective judgments pre-
sumably tapping lingering influence that already has been removed
from cognitive judgments) (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995), and vari-
ous on-line tracking methods. On-line tracking tasks have had partici-
pants move a pointer on a linear potentiometer (Gilbert & Osborne,
1989) or use a mouse to move a cursor toward or away from a target on
a computer screen (Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994). Our joystick
rating method was similar to these other on-line tracking methods but
allowed our participants to rate behavior on a fixed dimension without
having to divert their attention away from the stimulus material.
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